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Finnish Elites and Russia in the Nineteenth Century

The position of Finland in the Russian Empire affected relations between the Finnish elites — bureaucratic, economic and ideological — and their relations with popular groups within the Grand Duchy. The central elite, the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, assumed a dual role. This elite was the interface between the empire and the local population and it espoused both loyalty to the autocracy and consolidation of Finnish institutional distinctiveness — a position epitomized by the term «loyal patriotism». The Finnish state and its central administration emerged as a result of an external decree, which gave the bureaucratic elite strong reasons for identifying with and further developing the new political unit. A major factor in this identification was the fact that the elite lacked a real power base, most notably landownership, outside the bureaucracy. In enhancing the country's distinctiveness, the elite was well aware that it had to maintain loyalty to the autocracy and forestall all offences against social peace in the borderland. In its relations with popular domestic groups, the elite began to construct its legitimacy on its solidarity with the «people». Unlike nationalism in many other ethnically distinct regions of multinational empires in the same epoch, the Finnish variant, Fennomania, was not only a movement for liberation and emancipation but also a version of state-based nationalism. It included both upper-class conservatism, loyalty to the mother country, and a strong populist component. Finally, the bureaucratic elite had to utilize the learned estate (the clergy and academics) in their efforts to maintain loyalty to the empire. This need created (limited) tensions between the bureaucracy and the ideological elite.

Elites in a dependent polity

The relationship between the economic elite and the politico-military elite is a key element of state formation in developing societies[1]. Thus can be read the reflections of Nobel laureate Douglass C. North and colleagues on the connection between rent seeking and the use of violence[2], if those engaged in the former activity can roughly be equated with the economic elite and those engaged in the latter with the state elite (including the political, military, and administrative elite)[3]. State-making in developing countries can advance, so the argument goes, if economically powerful groups are united or at least able to avoid mutual conflicts to the degree that a monopoly of violence, necessary for a functioning state, can be established: due to common (economic) interests, the elites close ranks to the extent that they can agree on the use of violence.

This perspective also indirectly addresses the question of the elites' relation to other groups in society. In a state where unified elites enjoy a close relationship to those exercising coercive power, they can effectively limit the access of newcomers from other social groups to economic and political opportunities. The limits to the diffusion of prosperity and the extension of economic opportunities depend on the degree to which both coercive and other state institutions are controlled by representatives of larger groups in contrast to narrow elite[4].

Nineteenth-century Finland can be considered a developing society on the road to state formation. Therefore, the reflections of prominent institutional development scholars mentioned above may provide the starting point for the examination of Finland's consolidation as a state during this period. First, they imply that investigation of inter-elite relations and relations between elites and popular groups is also the key for understanding development in the Finnish case. Second, this perspective directs attention to two fundamental preconditions of social life, namely the control of violence and the organization of the allocation of economic surplus. Third, these preconditions are viewed as processes: the elite analysis is at the same time an analysis of the development of the political unit in which they operate. Fourth, examination of

[1] In various sections below I have benefited from *Alapuro R.* State and Revolution in Finland. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Ch. 2 and 5.

[2] «[D]eveloping societies limit violence through the manipulation of economic interests by the political system in order to create rents so that powerful groups and individuals find it in their interests to refrain from using violence» (*North D. C., Wallis J. J., Webb S. B., Weingast B. R.* Limited Access Orders: An Introduction to the Conceptual Framework // D. C. North, J. J. Wallis, S. B. Webb, B. R. Weingast (eds.) In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).

[3] The term state elite and the groups included in it come from *Etzioni-Halevy E.* Introduction // E. Etzioni-Halevy (ed.) Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization. New York & London: Garland Publishers, 1997. P. xxvi.

[4] *Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A.* Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. London: Profile Books, 2012. P. 75–83.

the elite configurations that originated in tandem with the formation of the nation-state is also illuminating from a larger perspective. Many studies describe the long-term persistence of these configurations, reaching far into subsequent periods[5].

There is one problem, however. These considerations, as well as many comparable elite analyses, mainly focus on the *internal* political and economic processes that shape inter-elite relations and the elites' relations to the masses. They fail both economically and in terms of the maintenance of order, to seriously tackle the issue of dependence on an external power center. More precisely, they do not address the problem of how external dependence affects elite relations *within* the dependent polity. This is perhaps partly because most development analyses examine post-colonial state-making, and thus they frequently focus on the period following liberation from colonial rule. In addition to these post-colonial cases, a distinct group of dependent state formation resulted from the wave of emancipation from large multinational empires (The Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires) in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the emergence of these new states, the elites were intertwined in different ways with the structures of the metropolitan power, and their domestic roles and mutual relations varied as well.

Finland is an example of such a state. It was a dependent minority region in a multinational empire in nineteenth-century Europe, and both the relationships between elites and their relationships with other strata of the population were shaped not only by internal social and institutional structures but also by the place of the Grand Duchy in the Russian empire.

Adopting this perspective, I will begin my survey with the elites in administrative and political institutions, including the issue of their coercive capacity; it was on this level that dependence was most concretely felt in Finland. Other elites — economic and cultural (or ideological) — are analyzed in relation to the administrative elite. Looking at relations between these elites provides a vantage point on the consolidation of Finland as a political unit in the nineteenth century.

The importance of the cultural elite, or more narrowly the ideological elite, stems from its central role in the regulation of the relationship between elites and other social groups. Obviously, the control of the means of coercion is instrumental in this effort. However, besides coercive power, the acceptance of existing power relations can occur through the legitimation of elites among the masses. Gaining legitimacy is a considerably more practical — and in the long term more functional — way of maintaining the position of elites than violence or the direct threat of violence, as long as their character and mutual relations do not make this process impossible to accomplish. Besides, changes in elites' relationships with the masses may also serve to re-form their inter-elite relations — for example, if one elite sought support from popular groups in order to gain supremacy over the others. This development has been examined most notably in the study of nation-

[5] See: *Field G. L., Higley J., Burton M. G.* A New Elite Framework for Political Sociology // Revue européenne des sciences sociales. 1990. T. 28.

building, that is, in the creation of an integrating ideology for a state or other regional entity. Those taking part in this process can be called the ideological elite. They are the people who are active in defining who «we» are, the character of our mutual relations and the nature of the epoch more generally, including «our» place in this entity.

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In the examination of elites, the following elements are included from three different but related levels[6]:

(1) the institutional level: the formation and interrelations of the top strata of various institutional fields (that is what elites are)[7];

(2) the recruitment of elites and their character as a social group: the class composition and class background of elites, their education, ideologies and political orientations;

(3) personal connections, i.e., inter-elite networks.

Levels 2 and 3 are the most closely intertwined; thus, they are largely treated together.

State institutions and economic activity

When the Russian Emperor Alexander I decided to create a Grand Duchy from the eastern counties of the Kingdom of Sweden and annexed to it the so-called Old Finland conquered from Sweden in the eighteenth century, he maintained the existing institutions of local administration and the Church. Former laws and privileges were confirmed or extended, as in the case of the local university in Turku (Åbo), which later moved to Helsingfors. Apart from these favors, a central administration and a counterpart to the four-chamber Swedish Diet were created for the new administratively, economically, and religiously separate unit. As Anthony F. Upton puts it, Alexander «did not establish a Finnish national state, but he established a state machinery»[8]. As the backbone of the elites in this new polity served its highest bureaucracy, nineteenth-century Finland was a bureaucratic

[6] Cf. *Ruuskanen O.-P., Snellman A., Widgrén M.* Yhteiskunnan huipulla: Eliittirakenne muutoksessa 1809–2009 // P. Pietikäinen (ed.) Valta Suomessa. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2010. S. 36–37.

[7] See: *Etzioni-Halevy E.* Introduction. S. xxv-xxvi; cf. *Snellman A.* Suomen aateli yhteiskunnan huipulta uusiin rooleihin 1809–1939. Helsinki: Historiallisia tutkimuksia Helsingin yliopistosta XXXIV, 2014. S. 18–21.

[8] *Upton A.* Epilogue // M. Branch, J. Hartley, A. Mączak (eds.) Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire: A Comparative Study. London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1995. P. 283; *Katajisto K.* Isänmaamme keisari. Eliitin kansallisen identiteetin murros ja suomalaisen isänmaan rakentuminen autonomian ajan alussa. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2008. S. 241–248.

society through and through. There followed «a golden era <...> of the civil service and bureaucracy», where those who were «willing to wield power», «had to run for office»[9].

The highest domestic authority was the Senate. Its Economic Department served as the supreme administrative council, and the Judicial Department as the Supreme Court. The Senate was chaired by the Governor General, who was the highest official in Finland and commander-in-chief of the Russian troops stationed in the country. The civil service had an internal hierarchy and an official system of ranks. In St. Petersburg, Finnish matters were prepared and presented by the Committee of Finnish Affairs (between 1826 and 1857, the State Secretariat for Finnish Affairs), headed at first by a state secretary, and from 1834 by the Minister-Secretary of State for Finland, who was one of the ministers of the empire.

The central bureaucracy played a key role among the elites thanks to its mediating position between the Russian autocracy and Finnish society. This position implied two opposite perspectives on power. On the one hand, the Finnish administration really wielded supreme power within the country (backed by Russian autocracy and ultimately by its coercive capacity). On the other hand, it was subordinate to the metropolitan power and could only act within limits imposed from above — within limits dictated, above all, by the autocracy's high sensitivity to the maintenance of social peace in the borderland. Characteristic in the latter respect was the quick reaction to a number of student demonstrations in the nineteenth century. Russian troops were stationed in the country, representing the metropolitan monopoly of coercive power. They had no need to intervene in Finns' activities before the turn of the twentieth century; yet their sheer presence not only reminded Finns of the necessity of obedience but also placed strict limits on the expression of mutual tensions. Internally, it was the domestic bureaucracy that was responsible for the maintenance of order between social groups and the prevention of criticism directed at the empire.

In its role of a local powerholder dependent on a metropolitan power, the Finnish bureaucratic elite acted as responsibly as it could to promote the development of the country, following its own understanding of the best course for the nation. It was in a delicate position, trying to balance between the loyalty required by the Russians and defense of Finnish interests; in the nineteenth century, the latter consideration led to increasing political and economic distinctiveness. In other words, besides their administrative function, the highest tier of the bureaucracy — especially the Senate and the top civil servants under it in the sections responsible for various fields of state activity, central agencies, and county administration — also performed a specific political function, as long as the Diet was not convened. However, it did not entirely lose its role as a political mediator even after the Diet was convened in

[9] *Jutikkala E.* Johtavat säädyt. Aateli // Suomen kulttuurihistoria 2. Porvoo: WSOY, 1934. S. 44; *Ylikangas H.* Autonomisen Suomen virkamieseliitti // Suomen keskushallinnon historia 1809–1996. Helsinki: Edita, 1996. S. 487 (quotes in this order).

1863 (it subsequently met at regular intervals)[10]. Consequently, when the Russian Emperor created the Finnish polity, the position of the domestic bureaucracy was greatly strengthened. A central administration was constructed, but its role was not limited to administrative affairs. By suspending the Diet for nearly half a century, the Russians indirectly endowed the top of the administration with vital political functions. As Raimo Savolainen observes, «originally the Senate was supposed to function as an administrative agency, but in the minds of contemporaries it became the most central symbol of the political existence of Finland»[11].

Finnish administrative institutions dominated economic activities, as was the case in many other European countries that strove to eliminate backwardness in the nineteenth century[12]. The impact of market forces was shaped by means which only the state had at its disposal. The most notable examples are the creation of a separate monetary system, construction of a canal from Lake Saimaa to the Gulf of Finland, a railway network, and forest ownership regulations. The involvement of civil servants in economic-industrial development appeared particularly pronounced in the latter activity, as it concerned the largest area of forest in Europe, relative to the size of the country[13].

In 1856, two large industrial committees were established, and their reports would decisively guide industrial policy for many years to come. The required capital was provided directly by the state or by state loans. Relations with industry were close, and in economic policy industrial interests were prioritized over those of agriculture. Reforms that prepared the way for the rise of industrial capitalism were effected under the leadership of the bureaucratic aristocracy[14].

It seems that state guidance not only promoted the narrow economic interests of the elite (or the metropolitan power), but it also promoted the economic autonomy of the Grand Duchy more generally. It is of course true that dominant groups always claim general interest or even universality for their aspirations. However, in nineteenth-century Finland, «the interest of the nation or the common interest

[10] Cf. *Savolainen R.* Keskusvirastot, virastot ja laitokset // Suomen keskushallinnon historia 1809–1996. Helsinki: Edita, 1996. S. 305; *Westerlund L.* Lääninhallinto 1808–1917 // Suomen keskushallinnon historia 1809–1996. Helsinki: Edita, 1996. S. 371–372; *Ylikangas H.* Autonomisen Suomen virkamieseliitti. S. 464; *Snellman A.* Suomen aateli yhteiskunnan huipulta uusiin rooleihin 1809–1939. S. 77.

[11] *Savolainen R.* Suosikkisenaattorit. Venäjän keisarin suosio suomalaisten senaattorien menestyksen perustana 1809–1892 // J. Selovuori (ed.) Hallintohistoriallisias tutkimuksia Suomessa. Helsinki: Edita, 1996. S. 177.

[12] *Berend I. T., Ránki G.* The European Periphery and Industrialization, 1780–1914. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992; *Kuisma M.* Keskusvalta, virkavalta, rahavalta. Valtio, virkamiehet ja teollinen kehitys Suomessa 1740–1940 // Hallinto rahan, julkisuuden ja Venäjän paineessa. Hallintohistoriallisia tutkimuksia. 1993. N 9. Helsinki: Painatuskeskus. S. 10–11; *Haapala P.* Vallan rakenteet ja yhteiskunnan muutos: Mielikuvaharjoitus 1800–2000-lukujen Suomesta // P. Pietikäinen (ed.) Valta Suomessa. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2010. S. 30–31.

[13] *Kuisma M.* Keskusvalta, virkavalta, rahavalta. S. 11.

[14] Ibid. S. 95.

constituted the central *ideological* argument for economic modernization»[15]. What I mean is that this claim contained more truth than similar claims in developing countries more generally (and for not unselfish reasons: see the next section).

Those leading the Senate well understood that in order to successfully run public finances they had to develop the national economy as a whole, and therefore they strove to follow a policy promoting national interest that often surpassed group interests. Thanks to the predominant position of the state elite, canals and the railway network were not constructed with the needs of the metropolitan power in mind. The rather balanced design of these transportation and communication networks served «Finnish society as a whole and not only its narrow economic elite». Furthermore, the Finnish administrative elite, which was in need of foreign loans, was viewed differently from other representatives of dependent peripheries. For example the railway network was constructed nearly entirely through loans from Western European creditors, but those creditors did not demand economic concessions, as is often the case when developed countries provide capital for developing countries. Moreover, the creation of a domestic monetary system made it possible to integrate Finland smoothly into the international gold standard system, whence it could easily operate on international capital markets[16].

Considerable tariff privileges for Finnish products in the Russian market were crucial for the country's economic development. From the 1870s Finland became not only an exporter of raw materials (notably lumber) to the West but also an exporter of processed products to Russia. Exports to Russia were of primary importance in stimulating the metals, textile, and paper industries. «In the competitive Western market Finland was a typical peripheral producer, which mainly exported relatively unprocessed products like lumber and dairy products. ...The industrial branches producing more processed products, instead, largely developed thanks to the protected Russian market». The state played an important role, because the development of key Finnish industries was largely determined by the customs tariffs imposed by the Finnish central administration. In sum, the reforms carried out under the direction of the Senate created «functioning juridical and physical structures for smoothly working capitalist economic activity»[17]. In the economic integration of the country, the role of the state was crucial, even though toward the end of the nineteenth century its contribution to the economy was indirect rather than direct.

[15] *Haapala P.* Vallan rakenteet ja yhteiskunnan muutos. S. 30 (emphasis added). See also *Katajisto K.* Isänmaamme keisari. S. 233–241 on the sentiments of self-sacrifice for the interests of the country among the Finnish elite after the foundation of the Grand Duchy.

[16] *Kuusterä A.* Valtio, talous ja valtiontalous // P. Haapala (ed.) Talous, valta ja valtio. Tutkimuksia 1800-luvun Suomesta (2. revised edition). Tampere: Vastapaino, 1992. S. 73–79 (the quote from p. 75).

[17] Ibid. S. 84, 76 (the quotes in this order).

Why did the elite not attempt to maximize the extraction of surplus value?

In contrast to the usual pattern in developing countries, in the nineteenth century the Finnish economy was not harnessed to narrowly promote the interests of the elite. Instead, the economy developed in a relatively balanced way to benefit Finnish society as a whole and not only its narrow economic elite, as the construction of its transportation network clearly illustrates. However, why was a backward country able to improve economically by promoting national unity through the formation of «inclusive economic institutions?»[18]

The most convincing explanation is that balanced evolution was in the interests of the (administrative) elite, a point that is stressed by many economic and social historians. «The success of the state and therefore also of the Finnish administration depended on tax revenue, and tax revenue depended on the economy», observes M. Kuisma. «The consolidation of the state both internationally and in relation to domestic social forces was intertwined with the efforts of the leading elite group of society strengthen both their 'own' state and their own positions», he continues, adding that «[t]he state and the administration was the 'principal industry' of the civil servant elite and a strong state a necessary precondition for its own power position»[19]. In addition to this kind of structural unity of interests, there is evidence of concrete national development measures that at the same time strengthened the position of the bureaucratic elite: «The Senate strove to develop an economically strong society that was the best guarantee for securing its own position as well»[20]. Finland's liberal orientation in the mid-nineteenth century and thereafter was achieved «as a top-down reform pursued by a civil servant elite whose group interests were connected with the success of the state and state economy»[21]. Furthermore, the «[m]ost intensely interested [in advancing these reforms] were the civil servants themselves. The group that above all benefited from a sound and independent state economy was <...> the new noble civil servant elite»[22]. Moreover, the administrative elite viewed a strong state, the commercial exploitation of the country's forest resources and industrialization as means of ensuring a brighter, more stable future both for Finland and itself[23].

[18] To use a term coined by D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, two other institutional development scholars (*Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A.* Why Nations Fail. S. 75–83).

[19] *Kuisma M.* Keskusvalta, virkavalta, rahavalta. S. 10–11, 31 (the quotes in this order).

[20] *Kuusterä A.* Valtio, talous ja valtiontalous. S. 76.

[21] *Kuisma M.* Keskusvalta, virkavalta, rahavalta. S. 47.

[22] *Peltonen M.* Aatelisto ja eliitin muodonmuutos // P. Haapala (ed.) Talous, valta ja valtio. Tutkimuksia 1800-luvun Suomesta (2., revised edition). Tampere: Vastapaino, 1999. S. 122.

[23] *Kuisma M.* Yrittäjät sääty-yhteiskunnan luokkakuvassa // P. Haapala (ed.) Talous, valta ja valtio. S. 55.

In short: «The civil servant aristocracy that hoped to consolidate its own position and its own 'state' — the central administration of the Grand Duchy — saw the strongest foundation of its survival strategy in the fortification of the Finnish national economy»[24].

How did the bureaucratic elite come to adopt a view that furthering the consolidation of the country at the same time strengthened its own position? The analyses of North et al. reveal that this course of action is far from self-evident. However, an explanation can be sought in the place of the Finnish elite in Finnish society. First of all, the position of the elite and notably the administrative elite rested on a fragile foundation. These key elite lacked a structural base similar to that of the landed gentry in the Baltic provinces and the nobility in the other multinational empires of the nineteenth century, who were also landowners in their respective empire's minority regions. In Finland, the main landed class was independent peasants, who prospered in the latter half of the nineteenth century and became commercial farmers; thus, the cleavage between the land-owning gentry and the wealthiest stratum of peasant landowners was disappearing. Illustrative of this situation is the fact that after the Diet was convened in 1863 and onwards, the Peasant Estate became equal with the other Estates — the hereditary nobility, the clergy, and the burghers. The predominance of the civil service was based on its position in the administration of the Grand Duchy; their power was not guaranteed by the strength of their social class, which was the basis of the might of the ruling class in the Baltic provinces. When the historian O. Jussila writes that «in building a special status for the country in the 1810s and the 1820s, Finland's leaders fostered and developed <...> administrative autonomy, unlike the Baltic nobility <...>, which focused on the protection of its estate privileges»[25] the point is that the Finnish nobility lacked the kind of privileges that allowed the German landed gentry in the Baltic provinces to ignore the interests of the «whole society». In Finland the strength of the central elite group rested on holding key positions in the state administration, which were conferred by the Russian Emperor. These positions constituted the main source of its power, but they also defined the limits of its power. Here, the significance of the structural heritage from the Swedish period — the comparative strength of the peasant landowner class — is clearly manifested, along with other institutional and cultural continuities.

Second, Kuisma's claim, cited above, that «the success of the state and therefore also of the Finnish administration depended on tax revenue, and tax revenue depended on the economy», reveals a perhaps self-evident but important feature of the position of the civil servant elite. It could be a state elite because there *already existed a state-like framework*, of which the administrative machinery was an essential part. The existence of the state was the primary factor, the prerequisite, while the administrative elite was secondary, its executive machinery. Here, Finland dif-

[24] *Kuisma M.* Keskusvalta, virkavalta, rahavalta. S. 96–97.

[25] *Jussila O.* Suomen valtion synty // Pertti Haapala (ed.) Talous, valta ja valtio. S. 25.

fered from many developing countries and minority regions of nineteenth-century Eastern and East-Central Europe. In these countries and regions, following North's argument, the emergence of the state (and notably the monopoly of violence) was part and parcel of various inter-elite arrangements and struggles. In these cases, the state emerged as a part of those arrangements; in Finland, the state was an entity that already existed and was in fact granted to the elite by their Russian rulers. From this perspective it is unsurprising that the elite saw itself as the representative of the interests of the whole country.

Moreover, one more aspect of its relations with Russia reinforced the predisposition of the administrative elite to promote the well-being of the «whole society.» As stated above, because the elite was grateful to the autocracy for its formation and position, it was necessarily sensitive to all expressions of political discontent in the Grand Duchy and was willing to pre-empt them. It was against its interests to let tensions heighten to the level of open dissent, not to speak of the kind of disturbances which could have caused the intervention of Russian troops in inter-Finnish conflicts. Thus, loyalty to the supreme power was coupled with efforts to reduce antagonism between Finns. This duality was a part of the administrative elite's mediatory role. This is one further difference in the Finnish case compared to those developing polities where elites, finding common economic interests, enter into alliances to monopolize the control of violence against other population groups.

The specific nature of the mediatory role of the Finnish elite is clearly illustrated by comparing Russian rule of Finland to its partition of Poland, which was plagued by revolts and repeated elite-based conflicts with the autocracy in the nineteenth century. This testifies to a fundamental difference in the nature of the elites in the two cases. Poland had a glorious past behind it as a European superpower, and its annexation by the Russian empire had demoted its elite to a position of dependence in a fragmented country. Finland, on the contrary, was a former borderland of the Kingdom of Sweden, and the Russian empire had promoted its civil servants to the elite of a political unit of imperial creation[26]. The Finnish elite thus had good reason to take care of the generous gift conferred to them and remain loyal to the Russian autocracy. As the situation following the foundation of the Grand Duchy has been put: «The elite felt strong personal responsibility for Finland's existence. <...> Alexander I had given them fatherland, but it was in the hands of the elite to construct the Finnish 'state' and national spirit»[27].

Finally, the idea of integrating different population groups into the framework of the state seems natural in view of the elite's aspirations to reinforce the economic and political distinctiveness of the Grand Duchy throughout the nineteenth century. In order to strengthen the separate status of the country, it was important for the administrative elite to consolidate existing institutions and to encourage peasants

[26] Cf. *Upton A.* Epilogue. P. 287; *Snellman A.* Suomen aateli yhteiskunnan huipulta uusiin rooleihin 1809–1939. S. 41–44.

[27] *Katajisto K.* Isänmaamme keisari. S. 258.

and even other popular groups to identify with the developing state. Most clearly this effort manifested itself in the nationalist ideology and movements that appeared in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

In sum, the elite view of the reconciliation or even unity of its own interests with the interests of the whole country was not without foundation. It was based on the fragility its position — its nearly complete dependence on state structures — and on the need to look for support from outside the elite and upper classes to strengthen its own position and that of the entire country.

Links between the administrative elite and the economic elite

The recruitment of the bureaucratic elite, its character as a social group and its personal links with the economic elite complete the picture of the relationship between administrative and economic activity. For the civil service, its central recruitment base was, without doubt, the first estate or the hereditary nobility. Historically, it was a military estate, but in the Kingdom of Sweden it enjoyed privileges or even a monopoly over top posts in the civil administration. Its role in the administration was heightened by its weakness, comparatively speaking, as a landed class. In the new Grand Duchy, this dependence on the civil service was accentuated, moreover, by the fact that, simultaneous to the foundation of a central administration, the military posts of the Swedish period were abolished. This further increased the dependence of the nobility's male offspring on a career in the civil service. Nevertheless, at the same time the administration itself acquired new features, signs of the adoption of a modern conception of the bureaucracy. The requirement of an academic education was introduced as a precondition for entering the civil service, except for the highest posts. For the majority of civil servants, this meant a degree in jurisprudence, and soon jurists began to dominate the central administration, most notably in the Senate and its sections[28]. These were more important seats of power than the central agencies, in which expertise in different fields was required at the expense of jurisprudence and in which therefore other disciplines dominated. Thus, the body of civil servants began, little by little, to become professionalized[29].

[28] *Stenvall J.* Herrasmiestaidosta asiantuntijatietoon. Virkamiehistön asiantuntemuksen kehitys valtion keskushallinnossa. Helsinki: Painatuskeskus, 1995. S. 54–57; *Ylikangas H.* Autonomisen Suomen virkamieseliitti. S. 430, 436, 482.

[29] In the central agencies not only did those with military training gradually stand down but also those with a degree in jurisprudence gave way to specialists in different fields. Certainly, at the highest level the most prominent noble civil servant families managed to hang on (*Snellman A.* Suomen aateli yhteiskunnan huipulta uusiin rooleihin 1809–1939. S. 79–90), and several central agencies were headed by representatives of (old) noble families (*Savolainen R.* Keskusvirastot, virastot ja laitokset // Suomen keskushallinnon historia 1809–1996. Helsinki: Edita, 1996. S. 329). «For the recruitment to expert tasks [in central agencies] membership of university and clerical families continued to provide a good basis» (*Savolainen R.* Keskusvirastolinnakkeista virastoarmeijaksi. Senaatin ja valtioneuvoston alainen keskushallinto Suomessa

Reforms gradually contributed to changes in the nobility's way of life and the selection of civil servants. The nobility continued to have a strong grip on recruitment, but now young noblemen had to complete university studies, and the values of higher education and culture began to pervade their habits and social behavior: in essence, officers became gentlemen[30]. However, there was another consequence — the requirement of a university degree gradually opened the civil service to non-noble gentry as well, for example to the sons of teachers or the clergy[31]. In other words, the process of change reshaped both the character of the civil hierarchy — it remained conservative but began to include modern elements of competence — and the habitus and the position of the nobility in the bureaucratic elite — it began to adopt elements of academic education and culture in its way of life and lost its monopoly as the sole recruitment base of the greatly expanding civil service. This process continued apace in the closing decades of the century[32]. Symptomatic of the erosion of the position of the nobility was that nobility was becoming more a reward for rather than a prerequisite of bureaucratic success: those who advanced to the top level of the administration were usually ennobled[33] which means that the primary criterion for receiving a title was a high administrative position rather than prior membership of the nobility[34].

As consequence, the creation of a central administration necessitated the (active) adjustment of the first estate to a new set of conditions. As M. Peltonen puts it,

1809–1995. Helsinki: Edita, 1996. S. 79). In county administration the majority of governors (two thirds) in the nineteenth century were officers, but by the mid-nineteenth century the majority of civil servants in leading positions had a university degree (*Westerlund L.* Lääninhallinto 1808–1917. S. 359). See also *Konttinen E.* Perinteisesti moderniin. Professioiden yhteiskunnallinen synty Suomessa. Tampere: Vastapaino, 1991.

30 *Peltonen M.* Aatelisto ja eliitin muodonmuutos. S. 111.

31 *Ylikangas H.* Autonomisen Suomen virkamieseliitti. S. 451–452. Certainly, in the first decades of the century entry was only open to the lower echelons of the service, and at the top level self-recruitment continued, and family dynasties flourished (Ibid. S. 458, 497).

32 Ibid. S. 458, 466–467; *Konttinen E.* Perinteisesti moderniin. S. 144; *Snellman A.* Suomen aateli yhteiskunnan huipulta uusiin rooleihin 1809–1939. S. 91–95; *Jutikkala E.* Ståndssamhällets upplösning i Finland // Turun Historiallinen Arkisto. 1956. T. 12. S. 130–133.

33 *Ylikangas H.* Autonomisen Suomen virkamieseliitti. S. 428; *Peltonen M.* Aatelisto ja eliitin muodonmuutos. S. 116; cf. *Ruuskanen O. P., Snellman A., Widgrén M.* Yhteiskunnan huipulla. S. 43–44.

34 It is true that this practice was not new; it had been used in the Kingdom of Sweden in the seventeenth century at least (*Ylikangas H.* Autonomisen Suomen virkamieseliitti. S. 428; *Snellman A.* Suomen aateli yhteiskunnan huipulta uusiin rooleihin 1809–1939. S. 36–37). Nevertheless, ennoblement in nineteenth-century Finland was hugely more common than during the preceding Swedish period (*Ylikangas H.* Autonomisen Suomen virkamieseliitti. S. 462), and «the Emperors of Russia ennobled Finns at a entirely different rate from that of the Swedish kings» (*Savolainen R.* Venäjän keisari laajentaa suomalaisen aatelin piiriä // Suomen keskushallinnon historia 1809–1996. Helsinki: Edita, 1996. S. 463). Matti Klinge (*Klinge M.* Aatelointi palkitsemisen muotona // J. Strömberg, J. Nuorteva, Ch. Forssell (eds.) Valtio palkitsee — staten belönar. Helsinki: SKS, 2007. S. 114) stresses the element of the «political expediency» that led to the ennoblement not only of high-level bureaucrats but also of leading economic and university figures.

«[i]n *adapting themselves* to their position as subjects of the Russian Emperor and inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Finland, the leading families had to discover *new coping strategies*», or, as E. Konttinen observes, «the *adaptation* of the nobility to the bureaucracy was necessary for the interests of the estate»[35]. Indeed, the consolidation of the new civil hierarchy really occurred as a flexible adaptation to the obligations and opportunities given from above. It was not a process of harnessing or even monopolizing the emerging state structures to advance the elite's own special (economic) interests (in the spirit of those cases analyzed by North et al.), not to speak of a seizure of the state for private purposes.

While professionalization gradually began to influence recruitment practices, at the highest level of the civil administration strong social closure was maintained. This demonstrates an essential dimension of the «golden era of the civil service and bureaucracy»:

«The elite of the Grand Duchy of Finland coalesced around the Senate: the privileges granted by the Emperor to the first senators were passed down to subsequent generations through family networks. The point was apparently that when the Emperor had ...succeeded, on the advice of the Governor General or Minister-Secretary of State in choosing the right person, the choice of a successor from among this person's family members or intimate circle was bound to increase the probability of once more finding a suitable candidate. Marriages became common within the circle of senator families <...>. [They] resulted in family ties between senators and in the formation of particular "senatorial families". <...> Senatorial families developed into the new political elite of the Grand Duchy of Finland. <...> The circle was extended to the families ennobled in the nineteenth century. As a result, clearly more than half the members of the Senate were noblemen, against the regulations. ...Non-noble members of the Senate had ties with the nobility through their wife, mother, or mother-in-law. ...Irrespective of their origin, the senators belonged, through marriage, to the same social circle»[36].

The administrative elite was closely related to the upper stratum of the business and industrial community that developed in the nineteenth century. This connection is unsurprising given the close relationship between industry and the administration in the construction of the state, and above all the pro-industrial economic policy evident in the latter half of the nineteenth century: «Significant parts of the ancient elite of the society of estates, the noble upper class ...[attached themselves to] the new industrial and business group that took shape in the middle of the nineteenth century». Parts of «the noble civil aristocracy merged with the new industrial aristocracy», which was thus bolstered by families whose male offspring had earlier chosen military or bureaucratic careers. Consequently, «increasingly dense family

[35] *Peltonen M.* Aatelisto ja eliitin muodonmuutos. S. 122 (emphasis added); *Konttinen E.* Perinteisesti moderniin. S. 116 (emphasis added).

[36] *Savolainen R.* Venäjän keisari laajentaa suomalaisen aatelin piiriä.. S. 179.

connections» and «networks of loyalty and mutual dependence» existed between the bureaucracy and the emerging economic elite[37].

This is how the increasingly dense family ties and networks of mutual dependence and loyalty between the bureaucratic elite and the emerging economic elite appeared in social life:

«A lawyer son or a professor son-in-law, a senator uncle of a sawmill capitalist, a governor godfather and a judge cousin, the civil servant brothers of a noble engaged in industry, a father passing laws in the Diet and an assistant junior secretary in the State Secretariat for Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg constituted a network of loyalty and mutual dependence, bound together by <...> mutual understanding, and capable and willing to influence the decisions of the machinery of power»[38].

The Diet provided a concrete forum for nurturing the pro-business and pro-industry atmosphere that existed in administrative or political spheres. To big businessmen it offered an opportunity to influence state policy, notably through the estates of nobility and the burghers, to which many of them belonged, due to their origin (nobility) or wealth (burghers).

More than on inter-elite machinations or deliberate alliances, cooperation was founded on a common cultural-economic conception of how poor and underdeveloped Finland should be elevated to economic and cultural prosperity through international trade and largescale, modern industry. The elites were guided by a kind of shared ethos, based on a view of the interest of the country (the elites' own interests included, of course), rather than on a narrow calculation of their special interests alone. The economic elite's close links with other elites constituted, «as it were, a natural state of affairs, [a state of] internal solidarity and similar objectives, reinforced by family ties and cultural ties». An example is Leo Mechelin, professor, politician, and senator, who at the same time served as the director of Yhdyspankki, the first and for long the most important bank in Finland[39].

Central administration and the institutions of higher education

The division between administrative and ideological centers of power had its counterpart in the division between the two «leading» estates. The mainstay of the civil administration was traditionally the first and most powerful estate, the nobility, while clerics and academics were in the second most powerful estate, the occupational clergy. The university and the Church were closely related; the church elite

[37] *Kuisma M.* Keskusvalta, virkavalta, rahavalta. S. 46, 48, 49 (quotes in this order). See also *Kuisma M.* Metsäteollisuuden maa. Suomi, metsät ja kansainvälinen järjestelmä. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1993. S. 177; *Gluschkoff J.* Murtuva säätyvalta, kestävä eliitti. Senaattori Lennart Gripenbergin sukupiiri ja sääty-yhteiskunnan muodonmuutos. Helsinki: SKS, 2008 for a case study.

[38] *Kuisma M.* Yrittäjät sääty-yhteiskunnan luokkakuvassa. S. 49.

[39] *Kuisma M.* Keskusvalta, virkavalta, rahavalta. S. 38, 54, 55.

comprised both scholars and practicing clerics. When the estate-based Diet began to convene in 1863, university lecturers and professors gained the right to vote in the election to the Second Estate. The Church dominated communication from the center to the periphery through parish congregations, and it was responsible for local government in rural areas until 1865 as well as for public education — not only the basic instruction in literacy required of all Lutheran communicants, but also secondary education leading up to university.

Just as there were family dynasties within the bureaucracy, so too was there much self-recruitment and inter-group recruitment among clerics and academics. Nonetheless, another particularity was the continuing, albeit numerically modest, entry into clerical and academic groups from outside the gentry as a whole: that is, the ideological elite was somewhat less closed than the bureaucracy.

Relationships between higher-ranking civil servants and the learned estate were shaped both by domestic circumstances and by links with Russia, these factors being interconnected. The foundation of a central administration and the assignment of civil service training to the university had far-reaching implications for relations between these two elites[40]. On the one hand, the university — now called the Imperial Alexander University — became an institution providing vocational training for public service, but on the other hand it was controlled by the bureaucratic elite, which was intent on fostering the country's autonomy. The latter point stresses the ascendancy of the administrative elite; however, the former point underlines the potential for tension between the two groups.

For the administrative elite, the key factors in consolidating the distinct position of the Grand Duchy were loyalty to the Emperor and internal stability. In these efforts, it necessarily required the help of two central institutions, the university and the church, which played the main role in the legitimation of the social order and the creation of social cohesion. «While it was generally sufficient to secure passive obedience from other social groups, clerics and teachers were required to play an active part in the execution of government policy by assisting in the control of public opinion»[41]. Limits were thus placed on the freedom of action of academic leaders or the academic community more generally. The tension between the administrative and intellectual elites was due to political circumstances, but frustrations arising out of Finno-Russian relations were directed, rather than toward Russia, at domestic targets, i.e., at the local governing elite of the Grand Duchy. However, while the situation was bound to create friction between the administrative and the ideological elites, tensions remained limited because there was much sympathy among the

[40] In fact, civil service training had already been assigned to the university in the previous century, but a decisive move toward the dominance of bureaucratic considerations occurred after 1810, when the new competence norms were introduced (*Selleck R. G.* The Language Issue in Finnish Political Discussion: 1809–1863: Ph. D. thesis. Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass., 1996. S. 74–77; cf. *Wirilander K.* Herrasväkeä. Suomen säätyläistö 1721–1870. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1974).

[41] *Selleck R. G.* The Language Issue in Finnish Political Discussion: 1809–1863. S. 67.

university and the church elite for the administration's line, whose observance was keenly followed in St. Petersburg. The university represented «loyal patriotism»[42], which also played an important role in the appointment of bishops and archbishops[43]. The university (and the press, which enjoyed close ties to the university in the nineteenth century) provided the main forum in which manifestations of allegiance to and criticism of the Russian regime met; as M. Klinge observes: «The ideals of the bureaucracy and civil society clashed above all within the sphere of the university»[44].

Presumably, the university's role in training the civil service reduced its autonomy, but on the other hand its central position in the education of the administrative elite may have provided it with a new kind of authority or influence. As Klinge states, «[t]hus, the university had gained a central position in relation to the state, and at the same time it was, as it were, restrained [*sidottu*] in relation to the state»[45]. The latter view, stressing the dependence of the ideological elite on the administrative-political elite, had already been presented in the 1960s by an American scholar, R. G. Selleck[46]. In her view, the subjection of the ideological elite to political control was completed by the bureaucracy's progressive hold over education itself. The university and clerical elite lost part of their influence over the substance of the education they offered. In becoming a civil servant training institution, the university was increasingly influenced by external interests, and therefore its status diminished vis-à-vis that of the bureaucracy.

The former view has been expounded most notably by Matti Klinge. He argues that the task of training the civil service placed the university on a par with the administrative elite. Thus, alongside the civil service, the university had a «particularly central position», because in inculcating loyal patriotism through the ideological and professional instruction it gave to future civil servants, it took part in the great national project. Klinge observes that «[t]he university... was given responsibility for the moral values of civil servants and citizens, which would be both the justification and, during the hard times ahead, the guarantee of the political and national essence [*olemus*] of Finland»[47].

These two views of the relationship between the bureaucratic and the ideological elite are not, however, mutually exclusive. They constitute two perspectives on the same, dual, process. The former view stresses the fact that cultural and political room for maneuver became increasingly limited; the latter perspective emphasizes that the university had an influential position in looking after the interests of the state, despite all the restrictions that this entailed.

[42] *Klinge M.* Keisarillinen Aleksanterin Yliopisto 1808–1917. With R. Knapas, A. Leikola, J. Strömberg. Helsinki: Otava, 1989. S. 550.

[43] *Kalleinen K.* Suomen kenraalikuvernementti. Kenraalikuvernöörin asema ja merkitys Suomen asioiden esittelyssä. Helsinki: Painatuskeskus, 1994. S. 241.

[44] *Klinge M.* Keisarillinen Aleksanterin Yliopisto 1808–1917. S. 578.

[45] Ibid. S. 342.

[46] *Selleck R. G.* The Language Issue in Finnish Political Discussion: 1809–1863. S. 78–87.

[47] *Klinge M.* Keisarillinen Aleksanterin Yliopisto 1808–1917. S. 12, 46.

In its training role, the university became a platform for defending the social status of civil servants. Because academic education was a precondition for a career in the bureaucracy, the university acquired a more important role in the maintenance of social boundaries. As a consequence, access to university education became increasingly difficult: in the middle of the nineteenth century, university students had a more distinctly upper class background than in earlier decades. Thus, education became an ever more important tool for defending entrenched social positions[48].

The active role that the university took in training civil servants, maintaining social boundaries, and, above all, in the preservation of the delicate political balance in relation to Russia explain the rather common (Finnish) view that the university has been an unusually prominent institution in Finland[49]. The university's prominence was enhanced by the absence of the Diet as a forum for political discussion until the 1860s. The university constituted a forum in which tensions and disagreements between the bureaucratic and ideological elite found expression, disagreements stemming both from Finland's relationship with Russia and from inter-elite relations within Finland; added to these, toward the end of the century, was also the debate surrounding nation building (see the next section).

The specific nature of these tensions becomes clear when the situation in Finland is compared to that of Norway. There too the administrative elite was university educated (at Christiania University), but no tension emerged between the two elites. The university and the civil service enjoyed long and close ties and formed a unified power base. Their connection was not undermined by the kind of internal or external factors at play in Finland. No nobility existed in Norway, and therefore there was no friction between the first and the second estate, and the Union with Sweden failed to create a perceived need to control intellectuals comparable to that created by Russian pressure in Finland[50].

Of course, these internal tensions did not develop very far in Finland either. Many of the most prominent university intellectuals made the transition across Senate Square from the university to the Senate, and they included not only L. Mechelin but also such national figures as professors J. V. Snellman and G. Z. Yrjö-Koskinen. The two elites were based on different estates, but at the same time the whole system of estates was disintegrating (the fact that an academic education served as the qualification for the civil service is an eloquent indication of this process). The four estates increasingly ceased to reflect social differentiation in an adequate way. The basic social dividing line came to be that separating the «gentry» from the masses. The bureaucracy, having an internal hierarchy and an official system of ranks and its traditional base in the first estate, the nobility, constituted the core of

[48] *Konttinen E.* Perinteisesti moderniin. S. 125–142.

[49] E. g., *Klinge M.* Keisarillinen Aleksanterin Yliopisto 1808–1917. S. 50, 558, 578; *Allardt E.* Tieteen ja korkeakoululaitoksen kehitys keskeiseksi yhteiskunnalliseksi laitokseksi // O. Riihinen (ed.) Suomi 2017. Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1990. S. 618.

[50] *Myhre J. E.* Academics as the Ruling Elite in 19th Century Norway // Historical Social Research. 2008. N 33. P. 2.

the gentry (in Swedish, *ståndspersoner*; in Finnish, *säätyläiset*). Initially, the concept of the gentry referred, in Swedish usage, to the nobility, the clergy, and their social equals. Later, the term *other gentry* was used to refer to commoners who had entered the military and bureaucratic ranks and to any teachers and professionals who did not fall into the traditional learned estate of the clergy. Ultimately, the concept came to refer to a social identity recognized more by custom than law. It characteristics included a common lifestyle, restrictions in dealings with other social groups, and a common language, Swedish.

Finally, all the elites — which were to be found within the gentry shared a similar background: they were educated at the same university and often knew each other. The gentry was small in absolute terms: in 1870 it consisted of just 28,000 individuals, family members included, or 1.5 percent of the total population, and a good half of them belonged to the civil service[51]. Apart from civil servants in the central and local administration, members of courts of appeal, and officers, the gentry also included congregational clergy and university teachers — that is, people from both the bureaucratic and the ideological elite. In addition, it encompassed people active in economic life: estate owners, managers of steel works, sawmill owners, apothecaries, private tutors, and so on.

Elites and nation building

The role of elites in national building has been considered, schematically speaking, from two perspectives. In the first view, their role is linked to movements of national self-assertion and liberation in latecomer regions where language or other ethnic differences provide a strong incentive and means for the population to think of itself as a separate «nation» and seek independence — liberation from second-class citizenship. In this «autonomist» nationalism, the elites, or the movements' activists, consist of intellectuals from the minorities in question, who mainly belong to the middle classes. An example is provided by national liberation struggles in Africa and elsewhere. The leaders of these struggles have predominantly been teachers, other intellectuals, and university students (often educated in the universities of the metropolitan power).

This picture is reflected in M. Hroch's classic study of nineteenth-century nationalist groups among seven small, «repressed» European nationalities in the stage immediately preceding mass mobilization — Czechs, Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns, Norwegians, Flemings, and Slovaks[52]. He demonstrates the overwhelming importance of such intellectual groups as university graduates, teachers, priests, and petty officials, small-scale merchants, and artisans in these nationalities' independence movements. Activists were recruited not only from outside the nobility and the

[51] *Wirilander K.* Herrasväkeä. S. 135, 142.

[52] *Hroch M.* Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Prague: Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philosophica et Historica, 1968. N. 24.

highest echelons of the bureaucracy or from outside the ruling class of feudal society (which largely identified itself with the culture of the metropolitan power), but also from outside the newly emerging bourgeoisie, which was likewise culturally alien to nationalist groups.

The structure and role of elites has been very different in that form of nationalism described by E. J. Hobsbawm as a «civic religion» for the modern territorially centralized state[53]. Nationalism generally developed only after a strong state had been formed, to consolidate it culturally. A territorial state must foster in its citizens a set of motivations that produces an overriding sense of obligation to the state. Especially in the era of mass political participation, this version of nationalism has functioned as the ideology by which the modern state becomes part of the population's sense of identity. In these cases, Western Europe being the prime example, the main champions of nationalism have been intellectual groups linked to the ruling classes — in politics, the church, universities, etc.

These two versions of nationalism are historically linked in the sense that nationalism has functioned as the «civic religion» of the new state after a successful national liberation struggle. This is what has occurred in several Third World countries, where nationalism has developed into a source of conflict between competing elites in their struggle over the division of surplus values and the monopoly of violence accompanying it. Neither scenario, however, provides an adequate picture of nineteenth-century Finnish nationalism. Rather than representing one or the other version, Finland appears to have been in an interstitial position between the two, displaying elements of both. Nineteenth-century Finland was *both* an ethnically distinct minority region and a political unit with separate administrative, economic, and cultural structures.

This interstitial position was manifested in the bureaucratic elite's aspirations. On the one hand, it was elite in a minority region, subject to the metropolitan power, longing, if not for liberation or independence, at least for more room to maneuver and for consolidation of the nation's autonomy. On the other hand, it was the ruling group of a distinct political unit, and thus it was important for it to reinforce its own position in that unit. There was no clear distinction between these two aspirations. As a result the (administrative) elite pursued the «bureaucratic-patriotic idea of Finland», which included cultural distinctiveness while remaining loyal to the autocracy, as scholars such as Keijo Korhonen and Matti Klinge have long argued[54]. From such a bureaucratic-patriotic perspective, loyalty to the metropolitan power did indeed help in defending local Finnish distinctiveness. This attitude is

[53] *Hobsbawm E. J.* Some Reflections on Nationalism // T. J. Nossiter, A. H. Hanson, Stein Rokkan (eds.) Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences. L., 1972.

[54] *Korhonen K.* Suomen asiain komitea. Suomen korkeimman hallinnon järjestelyt ja toteuttaminen vuosina 1811–1926. Helsinki, 1963; *Klinge M.* Suomen kansallisuusliikkeiden sosiaalisista suhteista // Historiallinen Aikakauskirja. 1969. N 67. On an enlightening debate in the noble estate, see *Vuorinen M.* Finnish Nobility between Nation and Empire (The Swedish Legacy and the Diet of Porvoo 1809) // Петербургский исторический журнал. 2014. № 4. С. 102–104, 110.

evident, for example, in the early stages of the Finnish Literary Society, a significant manifestation of nationalism founded in 1831. In analyzing its membership, among other organized expressions of the national movement in Finland, Hroch found that upper-class representation among nationalist activists was larger than among corresponding activist groups elsewhere in Europe, and the proportion of nobles and high-ranking bureaucrats was particularly high[55].

The upper classes were also represented in the most central, and loyalist, manifestation of Finnish nationalism, so-called Fennomania. This movement originated in university circles, and part of its impetus arose from tensions between the learned estate and the bureaucracy. Its essential duality was clearly evident in its cultural and political objectives. On the one hand, the Fennomans defined themselves as *the* representatives of the people and the champions of their cause, and on the other hand they conducted a large-scale cultural campaign to «Finnicize» the country's elites. The former role was used to justify the latter. In the latter respect, they were willing to establish a Finland united in language and culture, but this was not to be achieved by dismantling the traditional power structures; instead, the country was to be under the guidance of a patriotic (that is, Fennoman) intelligentsia. For instance, J. Wuorinen remarks that

«The fact that the Finnicization movement was directed against the exclusively privileged Swedish-speaking upper class of that time did not imply the elimination of the upper class in order to found a democratically organized society, but the replacement of a Swedish-speaking upper class oriented to Swedish culture with a Finnish-speaking upper lass oriented to Finnish culture»[56].

Moreover, H. Ylikangas observes that «the initial intention was not to elevate children from popular groups into the educated class, but to convert [a part of] the Swedish-speaking gentry so that it would orient itself to Finnish culture; this group was to become a new educated class in the country»[57]. The main target was the bureaucracy. For the Fennomans its «Finnicization» served as the argument for their penetration of the administration. A landmark on this road was the nomination to the Senate of the Fennomans' leader, G. Z. Yrjö-Koskinen, in 1882.

In other words, the Fennoman movement, especially in its early stages, directed its criticism at the cultural identity of those who exercised power, without explicitly challenging the governmental structures which regulated that power. Thus, by 1863 it was «in effect attacking the bureaucrats while implicitly defending the administrative system of government»[58]. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, it provided the emerging state with an agrarian and religious ideological alternative.

[55] Hroch's findings for Norway (*Hroch M.* Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. P. 95–100) are largely similar to those for Finland, but because Hroch focused on the entire membership of the *Storting* in the decades after 1814, his findings for Norway are not fully comparable to the other analyses in the study.

[56] *Vuorinen. M.* Suomalaisuuden historia. Porvoo: WSOY, 1935. S. 273.

[57] *Ylikangas H.* Autonomisen Suomen virkamieseliitti. S. 513.

[58] *Selleck R. G.* The Language Issue in Finnish Political Discussion: 1809–1863. S. 203.

However, their idealization of and cultural alliance with the (landowning) peasantry did not imply a weakening of the position of the elites but their linguistic conversion.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, when the imperial policy of integration drove many top bureaucrats and senators from the civil service, Fennomania had gained a dominant position in the administration. Among the business and industry elite, much of the attraction of a high-ranking civil service career had already vanished in previous decades, with the waning of the «golden era» of the bureaucracy[59]. Both changes facilitated the Fennomans' penetration of the state machinery. Civil servants were not the only elite group in the Fennomans' sights. The movement, which had originated in an ecclesiastical and university milieu, extended itself to the economy as well. It was the Fennomans' ambition to gain a leading position in the national economy — to increase national capital, promote national industry, and create a national class of entrepreneurs, which could crush the dominance of old «Swedish money»[60]. Moreover, they largely succeeded in their ambitions: by the end of the nineteenth century a Finnish-speaking industrial and business elite had arisen and was thriving.

On the other hand, Fennomania, through its efforts to dismantle Swedish-speaking cultural dominance in the central institutions of the country, also advanced the cause of popular groups. In this respect, the Fennomans' advocacy of both the adoption of Finnish as an administrative language and the establishment of public elementary schools in rural districts was essential, for it allowed the cultural emancipation of independent peasants. Upward social mobility from the peasantry to the educated class was not insignificant either, although it became important only in the recruitment of the clergy. In the 1880s, the Fennomans also created the first Finnish mass organization, the temperance movement. By effecting linguistic reform and by extending the range of social groups involved in education, they contributed to social mobility and emancipation.

The Fennomans' cultural offensive to Finnicize the elites and their search for support from among the lower classes to realize this objective clearly appear in the following description of the situation at the end of the nineteenth century:

The power structure that had granted an indisputably leading position to the bureaucratic and industrial aristocracy began <...> to crumble at the turn of the century. Forces that came, socially, from below, the middle classes [*keskisääty*] and the peasantry, began gradually to push out, with the support of Fennomania, the old civil servant elite from the state bureaucracy and state power[61].

The Fennomans were loyal to the empire, but through their nationalist ideology they also acted to promote consolidation of the country vis-à-vis Russia. It was linguistic and cultural unity that the Fennomans considered necessary for national consolidation: the thin and culturally isolated upper strata of society were far too weak to perform this task alone. In fact, the Russians inadvertently supported the

[59] *Kuisma M.* Keskusvalta, virkavalta, rahavalta. S. 62.

[60] Ibid. S. 63.

[61] Ibid. S. 97.

Fennomans' aspirations, because they saw the increased use of Finnish as a means of counterbalancing the influence of Swedish, and ultimately Sweden, in Finland. From the 1860s, The Fennomans' main rivals within Finnish nationalism were the Liberals, whose power base also lay, naturally enough, in the upper echelons of university and cultural life. Although they were mainly Swedish speakers, the Liberals did not focus their main opposition on the cultural aspirations of the Fennoman movement. They did oppose the creation of a unilingual Finnish national culture, but for them constitutional legality — that is, the preservation of existing political institutions — and the continuity of the cultural heritage from the Swedish period were more important than language. Consequently, they were prone to stress Finland's position as a separate political unit more sharply than were the Fennomans. On the linguistic front, the Liberals were on the defensive, but in terms of the economy they represented industrial and commercial society, which was rapidly evolving.

In terms of inter-elite competition, the role of the Liberals differed from that of the Fennomans. The Liberals had their stronghold in the two elites that were the main target of the Fennoman offensive, the highest echelons of the bureaucracy and the top stratum of the economy, as support for the Liberals was largely drawn from the estate of the nobility and the estate of the burghers. In the Diet, Liberals formed the majority in these two estates, whereas the Fennomans had a majority in the two other estates: the learned estate of the clergy and the peasant estate.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the cultural protest that found expression in Fennomania had lost much of its acuity. By then Finnish had achieved a strong or even predominant position in the central institutional spheres of society. The aim, crystallized in the Fennoman movement, of creating an upper class culturally united with the majority of the people, largely by linguistic conversion, was materializing rapidly. Despite the linguistic division between Finnish and Swedish speakers, no deep tensions divided the elites, however, and a national culture evolved which included both Fennoman and Liberal ideas and completed the ongoing political and the economic consolidation. Both Fennomans and Liberals hoped to promote popular identification with the dependent Finnish polity in order to consolidate its position. The basic tenets of national culture were shared by all the elites — administrative-political, economic, and ideological.

The unity and responsiveness of the elites

In the 19th-century period of state formation, the Finnish elites appear both unified and comparatively responsive, that is, ready to make concessions to other population groups. Even though it was a radical move at the time, the extension of franchise in the parliamentary reform of 1906 (at a stroke the number of qualified voters was increased tenfold) seems the logical conclusion of a long-term trend[62]. In the

[62] See *Alapuro R.* The Construction of the Voter in Finland, c. 1860–1907 // Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History. 2006. Vol. 10. P. 10.

elite perspective proposed by North et al., this combination of unity and responsiveness may seem contradictory: the unity of elites tends to be conducive to the exclusion of other social groups from access to economic resources through the creation of a monopoly of violence in a state. In this scenario, the unity of elites is coupled with their non-responsiveness to the aspirations of popular groups.

In order to understand the quite different development in Finland, at least two important features in its political and economic consolidation should be recognized. First, a striking peculiarity of the Finnish situation is that state-making or the construction of an internally separate political and economic unit advanced exceptionally far under the tutelage of the metropolitan power. Finnish statemakers faced an entirely different situation from that in many anticolonial and nineteenth-century Eastern and East-Central European liberation processes, including the necessity of state construction in circumstances in which fundamental institutions and the elites attached to them are largely underdeveloped or are heavily shaped by metropolitan rule. This is the world of developing societies as described by North. Finland's distinct political position implied the kind of dependence that would affect its internal development in an indirect way, through (strong) local institutions. The place of elite institutions between the metropolitan power and the Finnish population was predominantly positive or beneficial for the development of the country.

Second, what was the nature of the unity that evolved in the Grand Duchy? This unity was in no way based on the coercive power of the Finnish elites themselves; the monopoly of violence in the country was not in their hands. On the contrary, they were subordinate to the empire's monopoly of violence, which presumably enhanced, rather than reduced, their unity. The relative unity of the Finnish elites evolved as an *active adjustment* to opportunities and incentives conditioned by the structure of Finland's political dependence and internal economic, social and political structures[63].

On the one hand, open inter-elite conflict would have been detrimental to the autonomy of the country. On the other hand, Finland's position offered opportunities for developing that autonomy further through cooperation between the elites, notably between the administrative and the economic elite. Undoubtedly, the small numerical strength of the elites was also of importance. Of those 28,000 individuals belonging to the gentry in 1870, certainly less than half were actually members of the elite. In the same decade, there were just 600–650 students at the Imperial Alexander University, and it was only at the turn of the century that their numbers would rise to 1,250[64]. Finland was a country in which «everybody knew everybody else», and personal links between elites were common.

[63] The groundwork was of course done in the previous centuries. In the nineteenth century, inter-elite relations were shaped by institutions going back to the Swedish period, such as the judicial system, the system of political representation and the Church. Now they became operative in the adjustment to political dependence and to the regulation of relations between the elites.

[64] *Klinge M.* 1) Ylioppilaskunnan historia 2. 1853–1871. Helsinki: WSOY, 1967. S. 3; 2) Ylioppilaskunnan historia 3. 1872–1917. Helsinki: WSOY, 1968. S. 2, 168.

Moreover, it is difficult to see what incentive the comparatively unified elite would have had to actively exclude popular groups from political or economic participation. The strength of the peasantry in the reconvened Diet, its central role in local administration, and ultimately the fact that it was the dominant landowning class would have made such efforts unrealistic. In contrast, the elite's position rested primarily on the confidence or support of the «people»; this was the key factor in the Fennomans' interpretation of the coincidence between their own interests and that of the country as a whole. The phenomenon of the linguistic conversion of the Swedish-speaking upper class is a peculiar but typical example of the elite's responsiveness. A considerable proportion of them adopted Finnish as their native language without coercion, and they even promoted the process through Fennomania. This development, the nationalization of the gentry without coercion and their subsequent promotion of the process, was unique among similar small nations.

In short, the Finnish elites had no domestic source of coercive power as an ultimate guarantee of their position; instead, they had incentives to consolidate the institutional distinctiveness of their country and their own position within it by confirming the legitimacy of the prevailing system.

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