PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — Table of contents
Contents of the issue of Petersburg Historical Journal № 3 (47) 2025
Petersburg Historical Journal № 3 (47) 2025
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — S. G. Serebryakova. JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE RUSSIAN CAPTIVITY DURING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904–1905)
The Russo-Japanese War has been attracting the attention of researchers studying the military, political, economic and diplomatic aspects of the war for more than a century. However, social issues are less often addressed by scientists. The problems of the Japanese in Russian captivity at that time became the object of research only recently. The main purpose of the article is to reveal the specifics of the organization of captivity, taking into account the specifics of Japanese prisoners of war. A brief historiographical overview of the study of the problem of Japanese prisoners of war in Russia is given, and the general conditions of detention of Japanese prisoners of war are outlined. The main issues considered in the work are the norms of international humanitarian law and the status of prisoners of war during the Russo-Japanese War, as well as the real conditions of detention of Japanese prisoners of war in Russia. The problems of organizing captivity with the involvement of new historical sources are outlined. The complaints of Japanese prisoners of war are analyzed, the reasons for these complaints are presented by the Japanese, and the reaction of the Russian administration. The conclusions are drawn that the Russian Empire sought to comply with the norms of international law but could not always do so largely for objective reasons. Russian archival documents and information from Japanese historiography were used to write the article.
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — A. Yu. Fomin. WAR AND THE “SMUTA”: THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT’S STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE THE ARMY’S LOYALTY IN 1905–1907
The unsuccessful war with Japan and the onset of revolution placed the Russian military authorities and officer corps in a challenging position. The challenge of the era was to combat the spread of revolutionary propaganda among the troops. For the government, the army was its last bulwark in the fight against the revolution after its humiliation in Manchuria, but there was a real threat of revolutionary unrest spreading to the army itself. These circumstances led the military authorities to realise the necessity of fighting the revolutionaries using their own methods — namely, printed counter-propaganda and oral patriotic agitation. Since 1906, a special subdivision of the military department — the Committee for the Education of Troops under the Military Council — had been examining printed matter intended for the troops and selecting publications that were useful from the authorities’ point of view. Dozens of books and brochures, as well as military newspapers and magazines with a patriotic slant, were approved by the Committee for the Education of Troops. The committee believed that official government publications would not be able to compete with the revolutionary and opposition press and therefore relied on private publications for support. Enterprising publishers were eager to offer the government their help in combating revolutionary propaganda in the hope of making a profit. However, the Ministry of War ultimately recognised the ineffectiveness of this approach. Soldiers were far more interested in anti-government propaganda that largely reflected their own sentiments than in conservative publications.
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — D. Yu. Kozlov. “THIS WAS THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF THE RUSSIAN COLOSSUS…”: ON THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BLACK SEA THEATER OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
The article under scrutiny herein undertakes a thoroughgoing analysis of the impact of the struggle between the Russian and Ottoman navies on the course and outcome of the First World War. The author’s primary focus is on the impact of naval operations in the Black Sea on the economic and, to a certain extent, socio-political situation in Russia and Turkey. It is concluded that the results of the struggle in the Black Sea, principally the actions of the opposing fleets on maritime communications, largely catalysed the economic and political problems in the Russian and Ottoman Empires, which ultimately led to their military defeat and subsequent disintegration.
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — S. G. Nelipovich. THE ROMANIAN CAMPAIGN: COMBAT LOSSES (SEPTEMBER 1916 — JANUARY 1917)
The combat losses of the opposing armies are indicative not only of the casualties and the intensity of the fighting, but also a factor in assessing the combat effectiveness of the troops. The article, which is based on documents from the State Military Historical Archive of Bulgaria (DVIA), the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA), the Austrian State Archive (ÖStA), the Bavarian Main State Archive (BayHSA), and information collected by researchers from different countries, identifies and clarifies the losses of the armies of Bulgaria, Romania, Austria-Hungary, the German, Ottoman and Russian Empires during the Romanian campaign (September 1916 — January 1917). The substantial losses sustained by the Romanian army in Transylvania, particularly in Dobrudzha, were a contributing factor to the defeat of the Romanian forces in the autumn and winter of 1916. This ultimately resulted in the loss of Wallachia and Bucharest. Researchers have not yet reached a consensus on the precise figure for the size of the losses suffered by the Romanian army, which is estimated to be between 300 thousand and 500 thousand men. The losses sustained by the Russian armies of the Romanian Front are documented for the first time (totalling up to 262 thousand men). The losses sustained by the armed forces of the Quadruple Alliance during the Romanian campaign of 1916 were significant, with a total of 167,000 casualties recorded. This was primarily attributable to the intensity of the hostilities. The Bulgarian army suffered significant losses, with estimates reaching up to 55,000 casualties.
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — A. B. Astashov. ECONOMIC ABUSES AND COMBATING THEM IN THE RUSSIAN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
The article is devoted to a rare topic — the analysis of economic crimes in the Russian theater of military operations during the First World War. In Russian historiography the question of abuses is more often considered from the point of view of class position or politicized approach to the activities of public organizations — All-Russian unions of zemstvos and cities. In this paper, written on the basis of archival materials, the emphasis is on the identification of economic crimes in the conditions of frontline everyday life, their types, dynamics, increasing volumes of economic losses, and their impact on the socio-political situation in the country. Particular attention is paid to the activities of public organizations and the attitude of the authorities and the army to them. The central subject is the fight against economic crimes by the army, especially in the Petrograd Military District. The author comes to the conclusion about the mass of problems in the organization of the supply of the population, the contradictory coexistence of two new types of war: regulation and free market is revealed. The war exposed the shortcomings of the system of supplying the army with the help of a group of persons (Jews) whom the authorities did not trust, and at the same time could not do without them. Hidden machinations, which were part of the daily routine of warfare, caused great harm to defense: speculation, mass fabrication of documents for property. The inconsistency of waging war “for money” was aggravated by the lack of reliable control, the absence of an effective legal framework, and the clash of interests of the military and civilian administration, as well as the agents of the free market. This combination of contradictory factors led to great losses of resources, suffering of millions of citizens, damage to the cause of defense, and the threat of loss of statehood. In this situation, sporadic, haphazard attempts by military figures to combat economic crime by neutralizing individual criminals, even of the highest level, were doomed to failure.
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — V. B. Aksenov. WAR AND BLASPHEMY: CRIMINAL CASES OF INSULTS TO THE IMPERIAL FAMILY DURING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE AND WORLD WAR I AS A HISTORICAL SOURCE
Cases of insults against members of the imperial family are a valuable source for studying public sentiments and the images of power formed in them; they allow reconstructing the portrait of an average insulter, as well as demonstrating the paradoxes of state practices of counteracting obscene statements. The sources show that the obscene political discourse of the Russo-Japanese War period, despite a comparable number of cases to that of World War I, is less diverse and emotional, with less prevalent infernal characterizations of members of the royal family and less pronounced eschatological sentiments and political rumors. The author believes that the state’s struggle against insults to power cannot be considered successful — in a number
of cases legislation and judicial practice contributed to the spread of insulting political discourse, creating relevant precedents and thus intensifying socio-political conflicts of the war era.
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — K. V. Godunov. DEBATES ON CIVIL WAR DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
This article examines how the debates that took place during the First World War influenced the dissemination of the concept of “civil war” and the impact this had on the political situation of the time. Particular attention is paid to discussions within the radical socialist milieu. It is demonstrated that the proponents of the slogan advocating the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war — first and foremost, V. I. Lenin and his supporters — acted within a specific historical and ideological context. They took into account the earlier discursive articulations of civil war as well as the experiences of socialists in other countries, particularly the rhetoric of Karl Liebknecht. Drawing on the views of prominent Bolsheviks such as A. G. Shlyapnikov, A. M. Kollontai, and N. I. Bukharin, the study shows that not all members of the party unequivocally supported Lenin’s call for civil war. Even among Lenin’s prominent allies, interpretations of the slogan varied, with differing views expressed regarding its meaning and practical implementation. Debates about the means of ending the global conflict and about the prospects for revolution and civil war were significant in several respects. During the First World War, the Bolsheviks acquired the reputation of being the “party of civil war”. This image played a major role in various anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaigns in 1917, even though in reality, not all members of the party fully endorsed Lenin’s position. Disputes surrounding the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war contributed to the cultural preparation for internal conflict. The notion of “civil war” gained renewed momentum and expanded its reach; its articulation during the crises of the First World War contributed to the radicalisation of the political situation. These debates among socialists led party activists at various levels — regardless of their agreement or disagreement with the necessity of civil war — to engage with the idea and to participate in the development of a political language centred around violence.
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — E. N. Nazemetseva. RUSSIAN DRAFT DODGERS AND DESERTERS IN CHINA DURING WORLD WAR I
Based on archival materials introduced into scientific circulation for the first time, the article analyzes the previously unexplored problem of draft dodgers and deserters from the Russian army in China during the First World War. The entry of the Russian Empire into the First World War caused serious changes in the life of the state. The mobilization of a huge number of subjects into the army had a drastic impact on the economic, political and social life of the empire. Despite the patriotic upsurge of the majority of the population in the first months of the war, a significant part of Russian citizens did not share these sentiments and sought to avoid being sent to the front, fearing involvement in military operations. Among the draft dodgers were representatives of different segments of the population and ethnic groups. Evaders and deserters moved inland to Siberia and the Far East, and subsequently left the empire. The main focus of the escapes was China, which occupied a neutral position in the war until 1917. The lower ranks of the Russian police and border guard service, as well as the Russian and Chinese local populations, helped the dodgers in organizing their escapes abroad. A network of clandestine migration routes from Russia to China gradually developed. Having arrived in China, as a rule, by rail, the fugitives settled in Harbin, Tianjin, Changchun, and Dalny, then received new documents and financial assistance from employees of German concessions, Russian nationals who settled in China, who were opposed to the Russian authorities, as well as from various criminal elements. The latter have gradually established an illegal business selling forged documents. After receiving new documents, the draft dodgers and deserters sought to leave China and followed first to the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, and then, as a rule, to the United States. Some stayed in China and joined the American army units based here. The problem of Russian draft dodgers and deserters testifies to the serious crisis of the Russian Empire during the First World War, and also demonstrates the important nuances of its relations with neighboring countries of the Far Eastern region.
PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — Wan Park. THE ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHÉS DISPATCHED TO RUSSIA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
This study focuses on Japanese Army attachés dispatched to Russia during the First World War, analyzing the nature of their deployment, their intelligence-gathering activities, their assessments of Russia’s military capabilities and revolutionary movements, and how the information they collected was reflected in Japan’s postwar military policy as part of the “lessons of the Great War”. Following Japan’s entry into the war as a member of the Allied Powers in August 1914, the Japanese Army dispatched military attachés to various countries, with a particular emphasis on Russia. Among all the Allied nations, Russia received the largest contingent of Japanese attachés, many of whom held senior ranks. Russia also treated the Japanese attachés most favorably, assigning them to frontline headquarters and permitting their presence at the general headquarters. In addition to official attachés, the Japanese Army also sent personnel to Russia under the cover of diplomats and students, although their number was smaller than those sent to Britain or France. In early 1915, Japan dispatched a support unit to Russia to assist with the assembly, deployment, and instruction of heavy and mountain artillery that had been transferred to the Russian military. This unit represented Japan’s only practical combat support mission to an Allied country during the war. Initially, Japanese attachés stationed in Russia evaluated the morale, unity, and general atmosphere of the Russian military command favorably. However, as Russia’s military repeatedly faltered on the Eastern Front, their assessments became increasingly pessimistic regarding Russia’s prospects for victory. Their focus then shifted toward gathering intelligence on the German forces engaged against Russia. Following the outbreak of revolution, the attachés observed growing disorder and disintegration within the Russian military. They began to recognize the dangers of blind obedience without understanding or awareness, especially amid the spread of liberal and socialist ideologies. At the same time, they interpreted Russia’s wartime difficulties and revolutionary upheaval both as a threat to Japan and as an opportunity to modernize Japan’s military capabilities and expand its imperial interests. Some even advocated for the deployment of Japanese troops to Europe. After the October Revolution, as tensions mounted due to the Soviet-German armistice and peace negotiations conducted without Allied consent, Japanese military personnel, including attachés, began withdrawing from Russia in early 1918. Upon their return, some expressed high regard for German military operations and proposed emulating them in planning future campaigns against the Soviet Union. Others, pausing in Manchuria on their way home, began preparations for what they called another imperialist war: the Siberian Intervention.