B. N. Kovalev. The human factor in the Soviet state security: the battle of Leningrad, 1941–1944 //
Petersburg historical journal, no. 2, 2022, pp. 191–200

Abstract:

The battle of Leningrad (1941–1944) was a fierce struggle. The Soviet state security bodies were
opposed by both the Nazis and their allies. The former did not always emerge victorious over the latter. This can be explained not only by the high efficiency of the Germans. The human factor played a crucial role in this confrontation: mistakes, miscalculations, individual derelictions of duty and failures of Soviet security officials. On June 22, 1943, the head of the Leningrad Directorate of the NKGB, Pyotr Kubatkin, held a training seminar for his employees. In the seminar, his deputy, Colonel Iona Ivanov, made the report “Secret agents: training and the pace of work”. It analyzed the experience gained by the KGB servicemen over the two years of the armed confrontation. Pyotr Kubatkin emphasized the following. “To make an arrest with no sufficient ground, with no adequate verification is a shame and a crime for our bodies. We should have a bare-knuckled fight with this shameful phenomenon in our ranks; we absolutely cannot put up with this crime. Our goal is to continue to work so that there are no violations of the rules”.

Key words: World War II, the Battle of Leningrad, Soviet state security bodies, special services of Nazi Germany.

Author:

Kovalev, Boris Nikolaevich — Dr. in History, Leading Researcher, St. Petersburg Institute of
History of the Russian Academy of Sciences
E-mail: bnkov@mail.ru
ORCID: 0000-0002-1904-1844

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