Nicholas I

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PHJ № 2 (42) 2024 — I. V. Ruzhitskaya. “CATASTROPHE” OR NOT: THE LATEST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CRIMEAN WAR

The researchers discussed in the report evaluate the results of the war and the reasons for its defeat, contrary to the tradition that has developed in Russian historiography over a century and a half. They believe that the degree of Russia’s military backwardness from England and France in the field of weapons is greatly exaggerated, and its readiness to repel a military threat is understated. Some of these historians believe that Russia’s loss in the war was due to the initial hopelessness of its strategic position, and was not a consequence of military defeat. The technical backwardness and weakness of the military administration, in their opinion, had no fundamental significance against this background: the outcome of the struggle was predetermined by the strong political isolation of Russia and the geographical dispersion of potential theaters of military operations.

PHJ № 2 (42) 2024 — M. M. Shevchenko. RUSSIA’S CRIMEAN WAR: POLITICS, STRATEGY AND PUBLIC OPINION

The Crimean War of 1853–1856 was the only war in modern and contemporary history that Russia waged in political isolation, being without a single ally in Europe. This circumstance, and not a technical lag, was the main reason for her loss. Based on the achievements of military construction in 1830–1840, Emperor Nicholas I, Field Marshal I. F. Paskevich and General A. S. Menshikov implemented a strategy that clearly divided all potential — threatened and actual theaters of military operations into main and secondary ones, the latter of which included the bloodiest of them — the Crimean one. Thanks to this, they managed to minimize losses in a notoriously hopeless war, and Russia, having lost its dominant position in Europe, retained itself as a Great Power. Due to the circumstances of domestic policy, the strategy of Emperor Nicholas I and his associates could not be correctly assessed by Russian public opinion. The historiography of the Crimean War actually reduced its scale to the problem of the Crimean campaign. This approach persists to this day and needs to be reassessed.

PHJ № 1 (37) 2023 – S. Andriainen. “The Vicissitudes of a tedious war”: the participation of the Russian Imperial Guard in the suppression of the Polish Uprising of 1830–1831

The article examines the combat work of the units of the Russian Imperial Guard during the Russo-Polish War of 1830–1831. The author considers it necessary to investigate the activities of the entire Guards Corps as a whole, and not only the combat successes of individual guard regiments. The author comes to the conclusion that the Polish War played a significant role in the development of the Russian Guard. After the end of the war, the entire guard was concentrated in St. Petersburg and its suburbs. The war with the Poles caused a patriotic upsurge among the officers of the Guard. This war helped Emperor Nicholas I to improve his relations with the units of the Guard.

PHJ № 3 (35) 2022 – L. V. Vyskochkov. Notes and projects of M. M. Speransky in the historiography of Russian source studies

The article discusses the main stages of the publication of the notes and projects by M. M. Speransky (1772–1839), who created hundreds of works on philosophy, jurisprudence, morality, religion, realized and unrealized projects of the state system, which were published and republished from 1802 to the present. In historiography, his early works are the most studied, in particular, his constitutional draft of 1809.