PHJ № 3 (47) 2025 — I. E. Barykina. THE FORMATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY CULTURE OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY: FROM THE MEMOIRS OF O. V. SINAKEVICH-YAFA ABOUT THE STATE DUMA OF THE FIRST CONVOCATION

This study focuses on Japanese Army attachés dispatched to Russia during the First World War, analyzing the nature of their deployment, their intelligence-gathering activities, their assessments of Russia’s military capabilities and revolutionary movements, and how the information they collected was reflected in Japan’s postwar military policy as part of the “lessons of the Great War”. Following Japan’s entry into the war as a member of the Allied Powers in August 1914, the Japanese Army dispatched military attachés to various countries, with a particular emphasis on Russia. Among all the Allied nations, Russia received the largest contingent of Japanese attachés, many of whom held senior ranks. Russia also treated the Japanese attachés most favorably, assigning them to frontline headquarters and permitting their presence at the general headquarters. In addition to official attachés, the Japanese Army also sent personnel to Russia under the cover of diplomats and students, although their number was smaller than those sent to Britain or France. In early 1915, Japan dispatched a support unit to Russia to assist with the assembly, deployment, and instruction of heavy and mountain artillery that had been transferred to the Russian military. This unit represented Japan’s only practical combat support mission to an Allied country during the war. Initially, Japanese attachés stationed in Russia evaluated the morale, unity, and general atmosphere of the Russian military command favorably. However, as Russia’s military repeatedly faltered on the Eastern Front, their assessments became increasingly pessimistic regarding Russia’s prospects for victory. Their focus then shifted toward gathering intelligence on the German forces engaged against Russia. Following the outbreak of revolution, the attachés observed growing disorder and disintegration within the Russian military. They began to recognize the dangers of blind obedience without understanding or awareness, especially amid the spread of liberal and socialist ideologies. At the same time, they interpreted Russia’s wartime difficulties and revolutionary upheaval both as a threat to Japan and as an opportunity to modernize Japan’s military capabilities and expand its imperial interests. Some even advocated for the deployment of Japanese troops to Europe. After the October Revolution, as tensions mounted due to the Soviet-German armistice and peace negotiations conducted without Allied consent, Japanese military personnel, including attachés, began withdrawing from Russia in early 1918. Upon their return, some expressed high regard for German military operations and proposed emulating them in planning future campaigns against the Soviet Union. Others, pausing in Manchuria on their way home, began preparations for what they called another imperialist war: the Siberian Intervention.