the Eastern Crisis of 1850

The Crimean War of 1853–1856 was the only war in modern and contemporary history that Russia waged in political isolation, being without a single ally in Europe. This circumstance, and not a technical lag, was the main reason for her loss. Based on the achievements of military construction in 1830–1840, Emperor Nicholas I, Field Marshal I. F. Paskevich and General A. S. Menshikov implemented a strategy that clearly divided all potential — threatened and actual theaters of military operations into main and secondary ones, the latter of which included the bloodiest of them — the Crimean one. Thanks to this, they managed to minimize losses in a notoriously hopeless war, and Russia, having lost its dominant position in Europe, retained itself as a Great Power. Due to the circumstances of domestic policy, the strategy of Emperor Nicholas I and his associates could not be correctly assessed by Russian public opinion. The historiography of the Crimean War actually reduced its scale to the problem of the Crimean campaign. This approach persists to this day and needs to be reassessed.