PHJ № 2 (42) 2024 — Table of contents
Contents of the issue of Petersburg Historical Journal № 2 (42) 2024
Petersburg Historical Journal № 2 (42) 2024
PHJ № 2 (42) 2024 — M. M. Shevchenko. RUSSIA’S CRIMEAN WAR: POLITICS, STRATEGY AND PUBLIC OPINION
The Crimean War of 1853–1856 was the only war in modern and contemporary history that Russia waged in political isolation, being without a single ally in Europe. This circumstance, and not a technical lag, was the main reason for her loss. Based on the achievements of military construction in 1830–1840, Emperor Nicholas I, Field Marshal I. F. Paskevich and General A. S. Menshikov implemented a strategy that clearly divided all potential — threatened and actual theaters of military operations into main and secondary ones, the latter of which included the bloodiest of them — the Crimean one. Thanks to this, they managed to minimize losses in a notoriously hopeless war, and Russia, having lost its dominant position in Europe, retained itself as a Great Power. Due to the circumstances of domestic policy, the strategy of Emperor Nicholas I and his associates could not be correctly assessed by Russian public opinion. The historiography of the Crimean War actually reduced its scale to the problem of the Crimean campaign. This approach persists to this day and needs to be reassessed.
PHJ № 2 (42) 2024 — I. V. Ruzhitskaya. “CATASTROPHE” OR NOT: THE LATEST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CRIMEAN WAR
The researchers discussed in the report evaluate the results of the war and the reasons for its defeat, contrary to the tradition that has developed in Russian historiography over a century and a half. They believe that the degree of Russia’s military backwardness from England and France in the field of weapons is greatly exaggerated, and its readiness to repel a military threat is understated. Some of these historians believe that Russia’s loss in the war was due to the initial hopelessness of its strategic position, and was not a consequence of military defeat. The technical backwardness and weakness of the military administration, in their opinion, had no fundamental significance against this background: the outcome of the struggle was predetermined by the strong political isolation of Russia and the geographical dispersion of potential theaters of military operations.