2024

PHJ № 2 (42) 2024 — M. M. Shevchenko. RUSSIA’S CRIMEAN WAR: POLITICS, STRATEGY AND PUBLIC OPINION

The Crimean War of 1853–1856 was the only war in modern and contemporary history that Russia waged in political isolation, being without a single ally in Europe. This circumstance, and not a technical lag, was the main reason for her loss. Based on the achievements of military construction in 1830–1840, Emperor Nicholas I, Field Marshal I. F. Paskevich and General A. S. Menshikov implemented a strategy that clearly divided all potential — threatened and actual theaters of military operations into main and secondary ones, the latter of which included the bloodiest of them — the Crimean one. Thanks to this, they managed to minimize losses in a notoriously hopeless war, and Russia, having lost its dominant position in Europe, retained itself as a Great Power. Due to the circumstances of domestic policy, the strategy of Emperor Nicholas I and his associates could not be correctly assessed by Russian public opinion. The historiography of the Crimean War actually reduced its scale to the problem of the Crimean campaign. This approach persists to this day and needs to be reassessed.

PHJ № 2 (42) 2024 — I. V. Ruzhitskaya. “CATASTROPHE” OR NOT: THE LATEST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CRIMEAN WAR

The researchers discussed in the report evaluate the results of the war and the reasons for its defeat, contrary to the tradition that has developed in Russian historiography over a century and a half. They believe that the degree of Russia’s military backwardness from England and France in the field of weapons is greatly exaggerated, and its readiness to repel a military threat is understated. Some of these historians believe that Russia’s loss in the war was due to the initial hopelessness of its strategic position, and was not a consequence of military defeat. The technical backwardness and weakness of the military administration, in their opinion, had no fundamental significance against this background: the outcome of the struggle was predetermined by the strong political isolation of Russia and the geographical dispersion of potential theaters of military operations.

PHJ № 3 (43) 2024 – O. I. Onianwa, U. B. Okpevra. A REVIEW OF BRITISH POLICY AND INFLENCE ON THE EXTERNAL MEDDLING IN THE PEACEMAKING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION OF THE NIGERIAN-BIAFRA WAR, 1967-1970

The Nigeria-Biafra War (1967-1970) constituted a pivotal con ict in the history of Africa, characterised by external interference. This study analyses the role of external powers, with a particular focus on Britain, in the context of peacemaking and con ict resolution in the war. This article examines the role of major powers, including Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, and their in uence on the peace settlement process. The historical narrative approach was employed to examine the subject matter in greater detail. The primary data was obtained from the British National Archives in Kew, London, and from contemporary secondary sources. The article demonstrates how these interventions in uenced the outcome of the conflict and a ected regional mediation e orts. The paper highlights that external involvement in peacemaking in an internal armed con ict has the potential to undermine the e cacy of internally-driven peace initiatives, and even impede the capacity to make meaningful strides towards conflict resolution. By analysing these historical events, this research o ers valuable insights into the complexities of international involvement in internal conflicts and their implications for peace settlement processes.

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PHJ № 4 (44) 2024 — D. M. Kotyshev. SOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE TIME OF BIRTH OF PRINCE IZYASLAV VLADIMIROVICH

The article focuses on the understudied elements of inter-princely relations during the latter half of the 11th century. In examining the circumstances surrounding the baptism of Vladimir Monomakh’s second son Izyaslav, the author seeks to present a coherent account of the developments in the relationship between Vsevolodovich and Svyatoslavich during the chronological period of 1077–1078. The relevance of this issue is underscored by the fact that it was at this time that the conflict over Chernihiv was emerging and the foundations of the conflictual relations between the descendants of Vladimir Monomakh and Oleg Svyatoslavich were being established — those relations that would determine the political agenda of the South Russian lands during the 12th — first half of the 13th centuries. It is proposed that Izyaslav Vladimirovich was baptised during 1077, during the reign of Vladimir Monomakh of Smolensk, before his transfer to the Chernihiv throne. Oleg Svyatoslavich was the godfather at the ceremony.

A. V. Maiorov. “…THEY DID GREAT HARM TO PEOPLE”: BESERMENS, TITYAM KUTLUBIY AND THE UPRISING OF 1262

In order to administer the territories that had been conquered, the Mongols opted to employ administrators from other countries and regions, rather than utilising local personnel. These administrators were expected to demonstrate loyalty to the new rulers. It was not uncommon for prominent international merchants, designated as ortogh, to assume the role of Mongol administrators and tax collectors. The surviving sources, originating from different cultural and linguistic environments and available to us both in the original and in translations into modern languages, as well as the latest scientific data on the main institutions and methods of governance used by the Mongols during the period of the unified empire, allow us to redefine the ethnic composition and nature of the activities of the Mongol authorities’ main representatives in the Rus’ lands in the mid‑13th century. At this time, the Khwarazm Turks, who had accepted Islam, played a significant role in the governance of the Rus’ lands. This included the representative of the imperial administration, Tityam Kutlubiy (Kutlu Bek), as well as tax farmers who operated in North-Eastern Rus’.